

REMARKS/ARGUMENTS

The Office Action of April 28, 2009, has been reviewed and the following remarks are responsive thereto. Claims 60, 64, 66-68, 72, 74, 76, 78, 79, 81-84, 86-88 and 90 have been amended. No new matter has been added. Claims 60-90 are pending upon entry of the present amendment. Entry of the amendments, reconsideration and allowance of the instant application is respectfully requested.

Claim Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. §103(a)

Claims 60-90 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Littig *et al.* (U.S. Patent No. 5,524,276, “Littig”) in view of Ishigami (U.S. Patent No. 6,625,445, “Ishigami”). This rejection is traversed for the following reasons.

Amended independent claim 60 recites, *inter alia*,

“receiving, at a computing device, a user selection of personalized information to transfer from the first mobile communication device to the computing device, wherein the personalized information...[and] receiving user input corresponding to a command to initiate transfer of the selected personalized information from the first mobile communication device to the computing device, wherein the user selection is different from the user input corresponding to the command to initiate transfer and wherein the user selection is received prior to receiving the command to initiate transfer of the selected personalized information.”

Neither Littig nor Ishigami, either separately or in combination, teaches or suggests such features. In rejecting claim 60, the Office Action asserts at p. 2, para. 3, that the entry of ‘#66#’ and/or ‘#69#’ described in Littig at FIG. 6A constitutes a user selection of personalized information. Applicants respectfully disagree. As clearly stated by Littig at col. 6, ll. 20-28, the entry of ‘#69#’ on a first radio “enabl[es] the coupled radio to receive data and send data” and entry of ‘#66#’ on a second universal radio “enable[es] the radio to send data and receive data.” Indeed, nowhere does Littig teach or suggest that those codes correspond to selection of personalized information. Simply put, the mere enablement of a radio to send and receive data does not constitute selection of personalized information to transfer from a first mobile communication device to a computing device as recited in claim 60.

Furthermore, even assuming, without conceding, that the codes ‘#66#’ or ‘#69#’ describe user selection of personalized information, Littig still fails to teach or suggest receiving user input

corresponding to a command to initiate transfer of the selected personalized information. Significantly, nowhere in any of FIGS. 6A-6E or the corresponding detailed description, does Littig teach or suggest a user command to initiate the transfer of data that is different from the data reception and transfer codes discussed above (i.e., the alleged user selection of personalized information). Ishigami fails to cure any of these deficiencies of Littig. Accordingly, notwithstanding whether Littig and Ishigami are properly combinable, claim 60 is allowable for at least these reasons.

Amended independent claims 68 and 74 recite features similar to those discussed above with respect to claim 60 and are thus allowable for at least the same reasons as claim 60.

Claims 61-67, 69-73 and 75-77 are dependent on claims 60, 68 and 74, respectively, and are thus allowable for at least the same reasons as their respective base claim.

Amended independent claim 78 recites, *inter alia*,

“displaying, at [a] computing device, a selection interface including a list of a plurality of personalized information previously stored at the computing device...[and] receiving, through an input of the computing device, a user selection of the previously stored personalized information from the list of the plurality of previously stored personalized information in the displayed selection interface to send to the mobile communication device, the input being different from the mobile communication device.”

The Office Action asserts that Ishigami generally describes a computing device that receives requests to write information previously stored at the computing device, displaying a list of personalized information, receiving a user selection of personalized information and sending the selected personalized information to a mobile communication device. Even assuming, without conceding, that the above assertions are valid, Ishigami and Littig both still fail to teach or suggest display of a selection interface from which user selections of personalized information are received. For example, even taking the Office Action’s assertion that Ishigami displays a list of phone records as true, there is no teaching or suggestion that this list is a selection interface or that a user selects personalized information to transmit to a mobile communication device therefrom. At best, Ishigami merely describes computer 20 having a monitor 204 for displaying necessary information. Col. 4, ll. 36-39. Additionally, Applicants note that the search tables cited in the Office Action are not previously stored information and are, in fact, created after the

data transfer has begun. *See, e.g.*, FIG. 6. Accordingly, claim 78 is allowable for at least these reasons.

Claims 83 and 87 recite feature similar to those discussed above with respect to claim 83 and are thus allowable for at least the same reasons as claim 83.

Claims 79-82, 84-86 and 88-90 are dependent on claims 78, 83 and 87, respectively, and are thus allowable for at least the same reasons as their respective base claim and further in view of the novel and non-obvious features cited therein. For example, claims 66, 81, 86 and 90 all relate to reformatting the at least one information record including truncating the at least one information record to fit within a data field size of a mobile communication device. Neither Littig nor Ishigami teaches or suggests such features. The Office Action asserts Littig describes truncation at FIG. 6E, step 649. Applicants respectfully disagree. Even assuming, without conceding, that the transmission of the alleged only 20 repertories constitutes truncation of a larger set, there is still no teaching or suggestion of truncation an individual information record (e.g., 1 repertory). Accordingly, claims 66, 81, 86 and 90 are allowable for this additional reason.

Additionally, claims 65, 73, 77, 80, 85 and 89 generally relate to evaluating a mobile communication device's capabilities including a data field size of a data record for storing the personalized information. The Office Action asserts that 20 repertories constitute a data field size of a data record at p. 5. Applicants respectfully disagree. As a preliminary matter, Littig states that 20 repertory locations is a default setting, not a device capability. Col. 8, ll. 22-25. Furthermore, Littig describes that a repertory directory is available to the user for quickly accessing a telephone number via a memory location. Accordingly, it follows that each repertory location constitutes a data record (i.e., storage of a telephone number in association with a memory location). Accordingly, there is no teaching or suggestion in Littig of evaluating the size of each memory location or repertory location. The Office Action's erroneous assertion of 20 repertory locations describing a data field size of a data record is nonsensical. That is, the Office Action is arbitrarily asserting that 20 repertory locations constitute a single data record when such an assertion is entirely unsupported by Littig. Ishigami fails to cure this deficiency of Littig. Claims 65, 73, 77, 80, 85 and 89 are thus allowable for this additional reason.

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CONCLUSION

All rejections having been addressed, Applicants respectfully submit that the instant application is in condition for allowance, and respectfully solicit prompt notification of the same. However, if for any reason the Examiner believes the application is not in condition for allowance or there are any questions, the Examiner is requested to contact the undersigned at (202) 824-3156.

Respectfully submitted,

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